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The Question of Berne Entry for the United States
INTRODUCTION
A CCORDING TO ONE observer, the signing of the Copyright Act
of 1976 "brought with it a combined sense of gratification and anx-
iety, relief and disorientation of the sort that inevitably accompanies
the sudden achievement of long sought goals."' This comment comes
as no surprise, since efforts to overhaul the Act of 1909 began in
1924.2 The 1976 version has been described as a radical departure
from the previous 1909 Copyright Act, containing certain fundamental
changes which are "so profound that they mark a shift in direction for
the very philosophy of copyright itself."'3
Among the[- ssues raised by the revision is whether the United
States ought to step up its international copyright obligations. Though
the United States is a party to several multilateral agreements(_ it has
chosen not to accede to the most demanding of all copyright treaties,
the European inspired Berne Convention, since its inception in 1886.
This note will consider the current scheme of international copyright
Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L.S.L.REV. 477,
478 (1977). The author of this piece, Barbara Ringer, currently serves as Register of
Copyrights for the United States. In view of the very significant impact that the United
States Copyright Office had in the process of copyright law revision, Ms. Ringer's views
are critical to any analysis of the recently enacted statute and its legislative history.
The article cited above serves as an excellent summary of the major changes which
have resulted from the Copyright Act of 1976.
1 Goldman, Study No.1, The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from
1901 to 1954, in II STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1106 (Arthur Fisher mem. ed. 1963).
3 Ringer, note 1 supra.
ffBesides the Universal Copyright Convention, several multilateral conventions
have been struck among the Pan-American countries. By far, the most significant of
these is the Buenos Aires Convention which was ratified by the United States. For the
most part, these agreements are open to accession only by American republics, and,
perhaps partly for that reason, have not enjoyed the success or support which Berne
has had. See McConnel4,he Effect of the Universal Copyright Convention on Other
International Conventions and Arrangements, 9 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 32,
36-38 (1958).\
International copyright law is further composed of various bilateral agreements,
see id. at 38-43, and the fairly recent International Phonogram Convention, see,
Abelman & Berkowitz, International Copyright Law, 22 N.Y.L.S.L.REv. 619, 644
(1977).
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protection, the advantages the United States might gain by acceding to
the Berne Convention, the impact the 1976 Copyright Act has had
upon the Berne issue, and the remaining fundamental obstacles to ac-
cession.
I. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE UNITED STATES
A. Present International Scheme
In order to trace the development of modern international
copyright law, one must begin with the formation of the Berne
Union.- Created in 1886, the Union consisted of twelve original
signatories to the Berne Convention and, according to a recent count,
its membership has expanded to sixty-five signatories. 6 The principles
which the members adhere to are embodied in the original Berne Con-
vention, and the revisions which have taken place at Berlin in 1908,
Rome in 1928, Brussels in 1948, Stockholm in 1967 and Paris in 1971.1
Berne ranks as the most successful of all the copyright treaties which
have been signed.8
The Berne Convention is founded upon the notion of national
treatment. That is to say, a foreign author who has acquired copyright
protection under the treaty has available the same rights and remedies
as a domestic author would have in the state in which protection is
sought. Under Berne, copyright is secured throughout the Union if the
author is a national of a member country, and the author's work is
either in unpublished form or was first published in a country of the
Union. 9 Furthermore, under a provision which has been somewhat
abused, authors who are not nationals can get protection if their works
are first published in a member country.10
For a discussion on the state of international copyright law prior to Berne, see
1 S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY
30-66 (1938).
Abelman & Berkowitz, supra note 4, at 647-51.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary Works, revised at Brussels on
June 26, 1948, 331 U.N.T.S. 218 [hereinafter cited as Berne Convention].
B See note 4 supra.
9 Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 4.
10 Id. art. 6(1). American publishers have traditionally exploited this provision by
simultaneously publishing works in both the United States and Canada, which is a
Berne Union member. This is known as the "Backdoor to Berne." A work is con-
sidered as having been published simultaneously in several countries where there has
been publication in two or more counties within thirty days of its first publication. Id.
art. 4(3). Simultaneity will secure Berne protection if at least one of the countries of
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There are, however, certain principles contained in the Berne Con-
vention which define the nature of copyright throughout the Union.
The domestic laws of a member state cannot override these principles.
For instance, since the Berlin Revision of 1908, there has been a com-
plete abandonment of all formalities pertaining to copyright protec-
tion, except those required for a country's own nationals. If the
author's own country does not require it, there is no need to register,
deposit copies of the work with a centralized office, or provide
copyright notice on the work itself, to receive protection in a member
state which does require these formalities of its own nationals." Equal-
ly significant, irrespective of any assignment of copyright, the author is
guaranteed a moral right in his work. This inalienable right entitles
the author to claim authorship of the work and to object to distortions,
mutilations, alterations, or other acts which do damage to his honor or
reputation. 2 Furthermore, the Convention sets a minimum duration of
copyright as the life of the author plus fifty years,'" and defines for all
member states which works" and which persons' 4 are protected.
Since the inception of the Berne Union, the debates have con-
tinued in the United States on the question of entry into the Berne
Union. After World War II, it became apparent that resolution of the
problem did not lie in more forceful lobbying efforts advocating acces-
sion. Rather, another convention was envisioned-to assure accession
by the United States and other American countries which had not
become members of the Berne Union.' 6 The task was given to
UNESCO, which saw as its purpose the creation of a "worldwide
modus vivendi " which would "assure the free flow of information, of
ideas and of works."' 7 UNESCO's efforts ultimately led to the creation
of the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC).
Though the principle of national treatment is also followed in the
UCC, the treaty differs from Berne in several respects. There is a
publication is a Berne member. As a result, American authors and publishers have ob-
tained the benefits of Berne without subjecting the United States to Berne obligations.
A. HANSON, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION 11 (1973).
1, Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(1),(2).
12 Id. art. 6bis(1).
I Id. art. 7(1).
14 Id. art 2.
11 Id. arts. 4, 5, 6.
"6 Wells, The Universal Copyright Convention and the United States: A Study of
Conflict and Compromise, 8 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 69, 86-88 (1957).
17 Id. at 88.
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minimum copyright duration of life of the author plus twenty-five
years. "'8 If the state in which protection is sought provides for a longer
term, then that term is controlling."9 In another vein, the UCC has no
retroactive effect following ratification.2 0 , This is to be contrasted with
Berne whose effect attaches to all works which have not yet fallen into
the public domain at the time of ratification. 2' Consequently, by way
of the Berne Convention, a work which has had domestic copyright
protection will obtain protection within the Union upon ratification by
the author's sovereign. The UCC provides for no such result.
A number of other distinctions are worth noting. The UCC has not
abandoned the need for formality of copyright notice, as has Berne.
To obtain UCC protection a work (1) must comply with all notice re-
quirements imposed by the country in which the work is published; 22
and (2) irrespective of domestic laws, must give minimum notice in
a conspicious place on the work as follows; the symbol ©, name of the
copyright owner, and year of first publication on all copies published
with authorization of the copyright owner."3 The UCC and Berne also
differ, to a small extent, in the types of works protected. Whereas
Berne covers choreographic works and audible performances not
recorded, 24 copyright attaches to the same under the UCC only if the
state in which rights are being claimed provides for such within its
domestic law. 25 The final distinctions which should be noted pertain to
the issues of moral right and the respective provisions for translation
rights. 26 There is no provision for moral right under the UCC.
" The Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 8, 1952, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, art.
IV(2) [hereinafter cited as UCC].
19 Id. art. IV(1).
20 Id. art. VII.
21 Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 18.
22 UCC, supra note 18, art. I11(a).
23 Id. art. III(1).
24 Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 2.
2 Published works enjoy UCC copyright protection through article II(1). They
receive the same protection afforded other published works in the state in which rights
are being claimed. Publication is defined as the reproduction in tangible form and the
general distribution to the public of copies of a work from which it can be read or
otherwise perceived. UCC, supra note 18, art. VI. Choreographic works and audible
performances would therefore fall within the category of unpublished works. Pursuant
to the UCC, unpublished works are afforded the same rights given other unpublished
works in the state in which protection is sought. Since unpublished works are typically
given less copyright shielding, the distinction becomes significant.
26 See McConnell, The Effect of the Universal Copyright Convention on Other
International Conventions and Arrangements, 9 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 32, 61
(1958).
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As mentioned above, the motivating force behind the UCC was to
widen the then existing scope of protection. Commentators are always
quick to point out that there was never any intention of creating com-
petition for membership between the two treaties.27 But the UCC
drafters did anticipate that Berne members might be inclined to drop
out of the Union and seek refuge under the more relaxed requirements
of the UCC. Hence, article XVII was incorporated, withholding UCC
rights from an author of any country which has revoked its acceptance
of the Berne Convention and yet sought to remain or become a party
to the UCC.
B. The Interest of the United States in Joining the Berne Union
Since the Berne Union includes members who do not adhere to the
UCC, there would be an expansion of copyright protection abroad for
domestic authors. 28 Though the "backdoor" approach has been used in
the past to obtain these benefits, Berne permits a way for member
states to challenge this method of securing copyright.2 9 Moreover, this
procedure has been criticized as an undignified means of securing pro-
tection; a world power such as the United States loses respect among
other nations of the world when it requires its own nationals to resort
to this method to avoid reciprocity for the benefits conferred. 0
Accession would also mean protection for a greater scope of works
in countries which adhere to both the UCC and Berne. Because of the
differing policies on retroactivity between the two conventions, a por-
tion of earlier works not given protection under the UCC would be ac-
corded recognition by Berne."
Furthermore, with passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 and its
higher level of protection, e.g., duration of term, the United States has
an interest in promoting an equivalent standard among other nations.
This interest would be served by demonstrating to the rest of the world
that the United States is willing to comply with the more rigorous re-
quirements of Berne.12 This is, perhaps, the most compelling argu-
21 Id. at 5,2.
28 See Abelman & Berkowitz, note 4 supra, for a comparison between UCC and
Berne membership.
29 See note 10 supra, and accompanying text. Also see Bodenhausen, U.S.
Copynght Protection and the Berne Convention, 13 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 215, 218
(1966).
:0 Id. at 218-19.
1' Id. at 219.
31 Id. at 219-20.
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ment for acceding to the Berne Convention. As it stands now, interna-
tional copy-right law is a complicated patchwork of various agreements
and conventions. The United States, with its abundant output of
copyrighted material, has an interest in seeing the law streamlined to the
greatest extent possible. The UCC and other copyright conventions
should be seen as interim points in the development of a coherent and
fair international copyright scheme which is most fundamentally ex-
pressed in the provisions of the Berne Convention.
II. BERNE ENTRY
With the new Copyright Act now in operation, there is need to ask
whether the United States ought to remain outside of the Berne com-
munity. Certain legal obstacles which would have barred entry have
been eliminated through the new Act. This discussion will pinpoint
those barriers which have been removed, and fundamental conflicts
which still remain.
A. Barriers Removed
1. Duration of Copyright
The adoption of a life-plus-fifty years term was considered by Con-
gress to be the most important goal in its copyright law revision."3
Previously, protection began on the date of publication and continued
for twenty-eight years from that date, whereupon the copyright was
renewable for another twenty-eight years.3 4 Among the reasons cited
for the durational change, Congress noted the impact it would have
internationally, with specific reference to the Berne Union. 5
13 [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5749. See generally Jackson, Duration of
Copyright Under S.22, 22 N.Y.L.S.L.REV. 241 (1976).
34 [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5749.
35 A very large majority of the world's countries have adopted a copyright
term of the life of the author and 50 years after the author's death. . . . The
need to conform the duration of U.S. copyright to that prevalent throughout
the rest of the world is increasingly pressing in order to provide certainty and
simplicity in international business dealings. Even more important, a change
in the basis of our copyright term would place the United States in the
forefront of the international copyright community. Without this change, the
possibility of future United States adherence to the Berne Copyright Union
would evaporate, but with it would come a great and immediate improve-
ment in our copyright relations.
Vol. 11:421
BERNE ENTRY
The change means that the United States now conforms to the
durational requirement imposed on all members of Berne. It
represents a significant step toward the goal of Berne entry.
2. The Manufacturing Clause
Before passage of the 1976 Act, a book or periodical in the English
language had to have been manufactured in the United States before
copyright protection vested.3 6 In the sense that this manufacturing
clause sought to give special protection to book manufacturers, it can
be compared to some of the early English notions as to who is to
benefit from copyright. Before the clause was incorporated into our
law, foreign works were permitted to be copied freely.3 7 In 1891, the
clause was adopted as a compromise measure, offering some minimal
protection to foreign authors, while protecting the interests of domestic
book manufacturers who feared competition from abroad.3 8 The clause
conflicted with the Berne mandate that the enjoyment and exercise of
copyright shall not be subject to any formality.
Under the new Act, the manufacturing requirements have been
scheduled for repeal as of January 1, 1981. Up to that time, a more
liberalized manufacturing requirement will continue in effect. 3 9 Accord-
ing to the House Committee, the five-year phase out was instituted to pre-
vent the damaging effects that an immediate repeal might have had on
some segments of the American printing industry. 40 Though there is some
evidence that the purpose of the phase out was to forestall any clear-cut
decision on the matter of the manufacturing clause, 41 for the purposes of
this discussion, it will be assumed that the clause will be repealed on
schedule.
16 Id. at 5780.
31 Comment, 49 MICH. L. REV. 417, 420 (1951).
38 [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5780-82.
3- 17 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
40 [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5782.
41 In a letter signed by Senators McClellan and Scott, the Copyright Office of the
United States was asked to undertake "a thorough study of the ramifications of
removal of the so-called manufacturing clause." The Copyright Office has expressed its
willingness to conduct the study. It is to be completed one year before the manufactur-
ing requirements are due to drop out of the copyright law. Ringer, The Unfinished
Business of Copyright Revision, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 951, 973 (1977).
For discussions calling for repeal of the manufacturing clause, see Comment,
note 37 supra; Ashford, The Compulsory Manufacturing Provision, 4 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 48 (1952); Note, 52 IA. L. REV. 1121 (1967). There is little, if
any, support for the clause among scholars.
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B. Fundamental Conflicts Remaining
Though commentators have pointed out a number of disparities
between existing United States law and that which would be required
for Berne entry,'4 certain of these conflicts touch on matters which are
fundamental to the American concept of copyright, specifically, the
issues of moral right and statutory notice. 43
1. Moral Right
a. American copyright law does not accept, per se, the doctrine of
moral right.
The Anglo-American notion of copyright is purely economic in
nature and dates back to the early beginnings of the printing trade in
England. With the advent of printing, the king sought a means for im-
peding the spread of heresy through the practice of issuing royal
prerogatives. The printer was given a royal grant of the exclusive right
to publish a particular manuscript. To further the policy of censor-
ship, the Stationers' Company was chartered by Queen Mary in. 1557.
Extraordinary powers were conferred upon it; printing was restricted to
members of the Company; the number of members was few (twenty-
two in 1586); and special privileges of monopoly were granted.44
Though the 1710 Statute of Anne shifted copyright protection from
the printer to the author, the right continued to be framed in terms of
a limited economic monopoly. An author was given a copyright grant
of fourteen years, followed by another fourteen years if the author was
still alive.4 5 The copyright-patent provision of the United States Con-
stitution adheres to this same idea by giving Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
4" By far, Professor Nimmer has done the most comprehensive analysis on this
point. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and
the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1967). Professor Nimmer's
article was written with a view toward the conflicts which would still remain upon
passage of the then pending copyright revision bill. For all practical purposes, the bill
which he considered was the equivalent of the new Copyright Act. His comments,
therefore, are still of great value on the question of Berne entry.
,4 Others have pointed to these same issues as the most serious stumbling blocks
to the Berne entry. See Abelman & Berkowitz, supra note 4, at 631; Bodenhauser
supra note 29, at 221-24; McConnell, supra note 26, at 34.
44 A. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 2-6 (1960).
41 Id. at 8-10.
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limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries. "46
The Berne Convention adopts the view that copyright is more than
just an economic right. In this sense, Berne parallels the French idea
that the droit d'auteur or author's right flows naturally from the crea-
tion of a work, and is not a matter of statutory privilege. The rights
which fall under the droit d'auteur include both pecuniary rights in
the work, and moral rights which seek to protect the personality of the
author.
47
b. There are varying notions on what constitutes the moral right.
Part of the confusion which surrounds the concept of moral right
stems from the conflicting definitions as to its composition. The most
expansive of definitions would hold that a creator is entitled to all of
the following: (1) the right to create and to publish, or not, in any
form desired; (2) the right to paternity; (3) the right to modify and to
prevent deformation; (4) the right to prevent excess criticism; and (5)
the right to prohibit other attacks on the personality of the creator.4 8
In practice however, each of the countries which purports to recognize
the moral right has adopted a different view on what its contents are. 49
The divergent treatment, in no small way, is a function of the varying
doctrines which attempt to justify the right.5 0
46 U.S. CONST. art. I.
41 See generally Katz, Copyright v. Droit D'Auteur, 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 177
(1959).
48 Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors
and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 558-74 (1940). For substantially the same list of
rights, see Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 521-34
(1955).
49 Comment, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 793, 798 n.52 (1975).
50 See, e.g., Marvin, The Author's Status in the United Kingdom and France:
Common Law and the Moral Right Doctrine, 20 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 676 n.6-8, and
accompanying text (1971).
Another commentator has said:
There is no one 'correct' definition. The 'correctness' is relative, being depen-
dent upon the scope one wishes to give to the doctrine of moral right. For in-
stance, a good basic definition declares:
The moral right is the right of the author to create, or not to create, to
present the creation to the public in a form of his choice, or to withhold it,
to dispose of this form as he alone desires, and to demand that his personali-
ty be respected in so far as it relates to his status as an author.
Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law, 24 So. CAL. L.
REV. 375, 391 (1951).
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In light of these differing attitudes, it comes as no surprise that the
Berne Convention defines moral right with a fairly limited scope. A
standard had to be chosen which would serve as a common
denominator for all forms of the concept. Hence, the Berne abridged
version:
Independently of the author's copyright, and even after the transfer
of the said copyright, the author shall have the right, during his
lifetime, to claim authorship of the work, and to object to any distor-
tion, mutiliation or other alteration thereof, or any other action in
relation to the said work which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation. 5'
Thus, the Berne standard encompasses the paternity right, i.e., the
right to claim authorship, and the right to the integrity of the author's
work. 2 The other elements of the right have been dropped.
c. American courts recognize a group of rights which is nearly the
equivalent to the Berne moral right.
The moral right has never been given recognition under past
United States copyright statutes. The same holds true under the
Copyright Act of 1976.53 All too often it has been said that the
absence of a moral right in American copyright law is a major barrier
to Berne entry. 54 The courts, however, seem to be more wary of the
label, than of the rights subsumed within the concept.5 5 As the follow-
" Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 6bis.
52 This paper will not consider the right to object to "any other action in relation
to the said work which would be prejudicial to [the author's] honor or reputation."
The ambiguity of the language seems to allow for the inference that this point of law
is covered by our law of defamation. See Nimmer, supra note 42, at 522.
11 But see Nimmer, supra note 42, at 518 n.107, and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Abelman & Berkowitz, supra 4, at 631; Note, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
793, 801-03 (1975); Comment, 51 TUL. L. REv. 309, 313 (1977); Strauss, supra note
48, at 506 (but finding that it is sufficiently recognized through other principles of
law); Nimmer, supra note 42, at 518 (but also going on to demonstrate an acceptable
body of law outside copyright).
15 'Moral right' seems to indicate to some persons something not legal,
something metalegal . . . . The 'moral right' doctrine, as applied in some
countries, included very extensive rights which courts in some American
jurisdictions are not yet prepared to acknowledge; . . . as a result, the phrase
,moral right' seems to have frightened some of those courts to such an extent
that they have unduly narrowed artists' rights .... Finally, it is not always an
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ing discussion will demonstrate, American courts, resorting to prin-
ciples of law other than copyright, have developed a body of principles
which offer much of the same protection that would be accorded an
author under the moral right doctrine. 6
i. The paternity right
The paternity right is held to consist of the author's right to be
made known to the public as the creator of his work, to prevent others
from usurping his work by naming another person as the author, and
to prevent others from wrongfully attributing to him a work he has not
written. 7
Courts have protected the right to the proper attribution of author-
ship by resorting to theories of contract, invasion of privacy, libel and
unfair competition. Though the exception to the rule, it has been held
that implied in a contract for the publication of a work is the promise
to publish under the author's name; and that the failure to attribute
the work is actionable. 8 It has been held a violation of one's privacy to
unmitigated boon to devise and employ such a common name .... A new
name, a novel label expressive of a new generalization, can have immense
consequences.
Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d. Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring). In Granz,
the court held that it was a breach of contract to sell truncated versions of a musical
work performed by the plaintiff, and that an injunction would issue upon a determina-
tion that the plaintiff had not waived his rights arising from the breach. Id. at 589.
56 To pose this question, another issue is necessarily raised: Are past state court
decisions of any authority on matters touching on "the moral right." Under the new
Copyright Act, state law copyright protection has been pre-empted with respect to
"works of authorship that -are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright" as defined by the statute. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)
(1976). Arguably, if the "moral right" is part of the "subject matter of copyright,"
then there is pre-emption. But the statute goes on to say that pre-emption does not at-
tach to "activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106."
Id. § 301(b)(3). Since moral rights are not treated in section 106, and are not
equivalent to any of the rights mentioned therein, there is good reason to conclude
that state courts can continue developing the American counterpart of "the moral
right," without fear that this area of the law has been pre-empted.
5 Strauss, supra note 48, at 508.
" Even the matter-of-fact attitude of the law does not require us to consider
the sale of the rights to a literary production in the same way that we would
consider a barrel of pork. Contracts are to be so construed as to give effect to
the intention of the parties . . . . If the intent of the parties was that the
defendant should purchase the rights to the literary property and publish it,
1979
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make an unauthorized distorted version of a painting, attribute it to
the artist, and use it as a design on a sofa cushion in a magazine ad
for the purpose of promoting sales of design patterns.5 9 An injunction
will issue on a theory of unfair competition if a truncated version of an
artist's musical performance is sold as a recording under the
performer's name.60 A cause of action for libel has been stated where a
sensational story was falsely attributed to a well-known newspaper cor-
respondent .6 Even where an individual does not hold copyright in his
the author is entitled not only to be paid for his work but to have it published
in the manner in which he wrote it. The purchaser cannot garble it, or put it
out under another name than the author's; nor can he omit altogether the
name of the author, unless his contract with the latter permits him to do so.
Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 193-94, 122 N.Y. Supp. 206, 207-08
(1910) (Seabury, J., concurring). Notwithstanding the above, the right of an author to
demand credit is only imperfectly realized in the United States. See Nimmer, supra
note 42, at 520.
19 Neyland v. Home Pattern Co., Inc., 65 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1933). The statute
was one for the invasion of privacy:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his
or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, § 50 (McKinney 1976). The statute also provided for a
private right of action. Id. § 51.
Similarly, where the defendant has mutilated the plaintiff's story by its adapta-
tion for a movie, a court has granted an injunction against use of the author's name in
connection with the film produced. Curwood v. Affiliated Distributors, 283 F. 219,
223 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). See also Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App.2d 207, 127
P.2d 577 (1942).
60 See note 66 infra. An unfair competition theory also was raised in Bonner v.
Westbound Records, Inc., 49 Ill. App.3d 543, 364 N.E.2d 570 (1977). There, the
plaintiffs (members of the group, The Ohio Players) made the following claim: Defen-
dants took unedited and unfinished Ohio Players performances on tape, wrote new
music and new words to'go along with the incomplete songs, hired other musicians to
play the new music and words into the Ohio Players performances, edited the new
songs, and released them as being performed by the Ohio Players in the album
"Rattlesnake." The court held that the "plaintiffs [had] established the likelihood of
success on the merits of their claim that defendant committed a deceptive trade prac-
tice." 49 IlI. App.3d at 551. "As we understand the law, it is implied at law in con-
tracts for the sale of artistic or literary creations, that the purchaser may not materially
alter the literary property or creation, in the absence of express language so permit-
ting." Id. at 550. Expressly disclaimed was any intent to render a decision as to
whether the action was justifiable under the doctrine of moral right. Id. at 551.
" D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101 (1st
Dept. 1913) (per curiam), modifying 154 App. Div. 453 (1913).
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own work, a cause of action can lie against another who has taken
credit for the work.
6 2
It should be noted that the courts have stopped short of full
recognition of the paternity right. For instance, it has been held that
an author need not be credited for a contribution to an encyclopedic
work.6 3 Furthermore, the right to receive credit for one's work is im-
perfectly recognized and can be contracted away, if done so
expressly.6 4
ii. The right to the integrity of the work
Again, outside the statutory body of copyright law, American
courts have sought to prevent tampering with artistic work by employ-
ing other principles of law. As a general rule, if the author has -not ex-
pressly waived the right to consent in his contract, courts, are willing to
grant injunctive relief where an adaptation deviates substantially from
the original work.65 A more extreme view would hold that changes are
62 In Bajpayee v. Rothernich, 53 Ohio App.2d 117, 372 N.E.2d 817 (1977), the
plaintiff had written a scientific article in the course of his employment regarding a
discovery he had made. The article was never published. Under the plaintiffs employ-
ment contract, he retained no copyright interest in the article. The plaintiff charged
the defendant, a fellow employee, with having appropriated his "ideas and language."
Specifically, the defendant had written an abstract relating to the same discovery, and
presented it before the American Society for Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics.
Various tort theories were proposed to support the claim. The court, recognizing that
this was a case of first impression, held that a cause of action did lie:
[I]s there a right in plaintiff to be recognized for his work product which was
violated by defendant's claiming that work product as his own? We conclude
that there is such a right? Although such right may not be invaded by a
failure to give recognition to another upon an authorized publication, it is in-
vaded when one claims the other's work product as his own.
372 N.E.2d at 821.
63 De Bekker v. Frederich A. Stokes Co., 168 App. Div. 452, 456, 153 N.Y.S.
1066 (2d Dept. 1915) (Jenks, J., concurring); Jones v. American Law Book Co., 125
App. Div. 519, 521, 109 N.Y.S. 706, 709-10 (1st Dept. 1908).
64 See note 58 supra; Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947). In
Vargas, the plaintiff, an artist, sued to enjoin the reproduction of pictures made by
him under contract to the defendant publisher, because of the failure to credit the
plaintiff with the work. The plaintiff had achieved considerable fame through publica-
tion of his drawings. Esquire, in the past, had always credited the drawings to the
plaintiff either by the credit line "Varga" or "Vargas," or by captioning the drawings
"Varga Girls." Under a new contract for drawings, the following provision appeared:
"The drawings so furnished, and also the name 'Varga,' 'Varga Girl,' 'Varga, Esq.,'
and any and all other names, . . .shall forever belong exclusively to Esquire, and Es-
quire shall have all rights with respect thereto, including . .. the right to use, lease,
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permitted in an adaptation only to the extent that they are made
necessary by the different mode of production.
66
There also has been recognition of the right to integrity under
federal unfair competition laws. In a recent federal case 67 much com-
sell or otherwise dispose of the same as it shall see fit ...." On the basis of this provi-
sion, the court held that the plaintiff had divested himself of all title, claim and in-
terest in drawings, made under the contract, and names used in connection therewith.
Id. at 526. The plaintiff had no right to be credited with the drawings.
65 In Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corporation, 262 F. 811 (S.D.N.Y.
1919), the defendant had acquired the theatrical and motion picture rights to the
plaintiffs story. Under the contract, "no alterations, eliminations, or additions" could
be made without approval of the author. The plaintiff objected to the motion picture
adapted from the play. The following represents the view of the court:
It i$ impractical to analyze the motion picture, scene by scene, and compare
it with the spoken play. The writer of the scenario evidently had in mind the
kind of presentation which pleases the audience of a motion picture play,
and to that end departed from the sequential expeditious course of the
spoken play. To illustrate that it is not necessary to follow the play literally, I
may observe that I should not regard the ballroom scene in the picture as in
violation [of the consent clause]. This scene, which forms a pleasant picture,
does not detract from the theme or continuity of the story, and, if anything,
might be regarded as a helpful illustration.
• . . But the point is, in view of [the clause], there cannot be a substantial
deviation from the locus of the play or the order and sequence of the
development of the plot. If these substantial features are retained, then such
pictures as may be necessary to explain the action of the play, and as may be
necessary in substitution for dialogue, may be entirely proper, and not in
violation of the [the clause].
Id. at 814-15.
Notwithstanding the emphasis placed on the consent clause in Manners, another
court has stated a somewhat softer rule, in the absence of any mention of consent to
change in the contract:
And now as to what is acquired when one procures the right to elaborate
upon an original story . . . I take it that, while scenery, action, and
characters may be added to an original story, and even supplant subordinate
portions thereof, there is an obligation upon the elaborator to retain and give
appropriate expression to the theme, thought and main action of that which
was originally written. The unqualified grant of this right is, I should say,
fraught with danger to a writer of standing, particularly when he inserts no
provision for his approval of such elaboration as may be made. Nevertheless,
elaboration of a story means something other than that the same should be
discarded, and its title and authorship applied to a wholly dissimilar tale.
Curwood v. Affiliated Distributors, 283 F. 219, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). See also Royle
v. Dillingham, 53 Misc. 383, 104 N.Y.S. 783 (Sup.Ct. 1907).
66 See note 65 supra.
67 Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1976).
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mented upon,6 8 it has been held that a statutory claim for mutiliation
of an artistic work can be made under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. 69 The court was faced with the following set of circumstances: In
1975, American Broadcasting Company (ABC) contracted with Time-
Life, Inc. to broadcast two ninety minute specials featuring the
comedy group, Monty Python's Flying Circus, and edited out twenty-
four of the original ninety minutes of each. Time-Life, Inc. had
bought an American distribution license from the BBC which in turn
had obtained the right to license overseas broadcasts from the Monty
Python Group through a scriptwriter's agreement. Under the agree-
ment, the group had maximum control over the scripts; the BBC did
not have the right to edit once the programs were recorded. Upon
learning of the editing done by ABC, which came after the broadcast
of the first of the programs in the United States, the group sued to en-
join broadcast of the second special, and for damages. The district
court denied a preliminary injunction, and an appeal was taken.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision by the district court,
and directed that a preliminary injuction be issued. The ruling was
based, in part, on the court's determination that the plaintiffs were
likely to succeed on two alternative theories. The first was a claim of
copyright infringement for unauthorized editing which exceeded the
license granted by the proprietor of the copyright. The second claim
made was that the editing constituted a "mutilation" of the group's
work in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. That provision
generally prohibits the false designation or misrepresentation of the
origins of goods and services.70 Up to the time of suit, the Act had
68 90 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1976); 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 452 (1977); 50 TEMP. L.
Q. 151 (1976); 125 U. PA. L. REv. 611 (1977); 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 595 (1977).
69 Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
70 Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or, representation, including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and
shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person
who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or
description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or
used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or
used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the
locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality
is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damag-
ed by the use of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
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never been extended to cases touching on common law copyright
issues.7" Nevertheless, the court reasoned that a complaint for mutila-
tion would seek to redress the same rights sought to be protected by
the Act and, therefore, should be recognized as stating a cause of ac-
tion under that statute."
d. Does the law in the United States meet the Berne standard of
moral right?
From the foregoing, it is apparent that a considerable portion of
the Berne moral right is recognized in the United States. Clearly, there
are deficiencies, and under a strict reading of article 6bis of the Con-
vention, the United States would fail to comply with the standard ar-
ticulated.
But do the Berne Union members practice what they preach? Have
all other members recognized the Berne moral right to the extent pro-
vided in the Convention? Clearly not, and the instance where it is most
apparent is in the case of the United Kingdom. This is not surprising,
since British copyright law so closely parallels our own. In the United
Kingdom, for instance, just as in the United States, the author has no
inalienable right to receive credit for his own work." This appears to
be one of our own major stumbling blocks in complying fully with
Berne. In another vein, the British case law demonstrates that there
are limitations to its recognition of a right of integrity,7 4 and this too is
inconsistent with the Berne mandate giving the author the right "to
object to any distortion, mutiliation or alteration thereof." (emphasis
added)
Despite these deficiencies, the British have remained members of
Berne, and no other member country has been heard to complain."
Therefore, on the basis of the general acceptance of the United
Kingdom's narrow scope of moral right protection, there is reason to
believe that the protection offered in the United States would meet the
Berne standard as it is applied in practice.
2. Statutory Formalities
The notice provisions under the new Copyright Act clearly conflict
71 538 F.2d at 26 (Gurfein, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 24-25.
Compare Marvin, supra note 50, at 694, with note 58 supra.
7' Marvin, supra note 50, at 702-03 (emphasis added).
'5 Consider id. at 678 and Nimmer, supra note 42, at 523 n.132, and accom-
panying text.
Vol. 11:421
BERNE ENTRY
with the Berne Convention. Affixation of notice has been a require-
ment for statutory copyright in the United States since 1802.76 In con-
trast, since the Berlin Revision of 1908, the Berne Union has abandon-
ed all statutory formalities with regard to the vesting of copyright ex-
cept those required for a country's own nationals. 7
Before the 1976 Copyright Act became effective, a dual system of
copyright protection was in operation. An author retained perpetual
common law protection of his work so long as it remained unpublished.
Upon publication, common law protection was lost, and the author
could only receive protection under the federal statute.7 8 In the early
Supreme Court case of Wheaton v. Peters it was held that this
statutory right could only vest upon strict compliance with the for-
malities set out in the statute.7 9
Though the formalities at the time of Wheaton were considerable,
they have been whittled away considerably over the years. For in-
stance, the copyright statute at that time called for a title of the book
to be deposited in the clerk's office; notice of the record made by the
clerk had to be published on the page next to the title page of the
.book; public notice had to be given in the newspapers; and six months
after publication a copy had to be deposited with the Department of
State. 0 These requisites of copyright were relaxed considerably in the
Act of 1909, which required that a notice of copyright had to be affixed
to each copy of the work which was distributed.8 ' Under the 1976 Act,
the failure to give notice and the failure to correct such omission 82 will
Act of April 29, 1802, ch.36, § 1, 2 Stat. 71.
7 Article 4 reads: "The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be
subject to the performance of any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise are in-
dependent of the existence of protection in the country of origin of the the work."
Berne Convention, supra note 7, art. 4.
" See generally Brown, Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law
Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1070 (1977).
7 33 U.S. 591, 633 (1834).
80 See id. at 633-34.
81 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1077. Contrary to the popular
belief, registration and deposit were not, and still are not, conditions precedent to the
securing of copyright. Under the old and new Acts, they represent conditions to be
met before the bringing of a suit for copyright infringement.
'2 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976) provides:
Effect of Omission on Copyright.-The omission of the copyright notice
prescribed by sections 401 through 403 from copies or phonorecords publicly
distributed by authority of the copyright owner does not invalidate the
copyright in a work if-
(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively small
number of copies or phonorecords distributed to the public; or
1979
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
result in the author's dedicating his work to the public."8 The per-
sistence of some formal requirement in our statute may simply reflect
the traditional Anglo-American view that copyright is a privilege
granted by the state, rather than a natural right growing out of the
work. 84
Apparently, the choice of continuing to require notice was not an
easy one. There had been considerable debate on this issue for
some time, with vehement supporters on both sides. 8s The Congres-
sional decision was, in large measure, affected by the recommendation
of the Copyright Office that the notice requirement be retained.8 6 The
Office's proposal came within the context of a preliminary draft bill on
copyright revision submitted to the Congress, after an exhaustive study
of the field had been undertaken. 7 Notwithstanding the careful treat-
ment given the notice issue by the Copyright Office, it would be
helpful to reexamine the problem.
a. The argument against notice
Those who call for the abandonment of the notice requirements
(2) registration for the work has been made before or is made within five
years after the publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made to
add notice to all copies or phonorecords that are distributed to the public in
the United States after the omission has been discovered; or
(3) the notice has been omitted in violation of an express requirement in
writing that, as a condition of the copyright owner's authorization of the
public distribution of copies or phonorecords, they bear the prescribed
notice.
Under section 405(b), an innocent infringer who has been misled by the omission is ab-
solved from liability. See also section 406 which pertains to errors in the notice.
Is It is of course true that the publication of a copyrightable "work" puts
that "work" into the public domain except so far as it may be protected by
copyright. That has been unquestioned law since 1774 . ..and courts have
often spoke of it as a "dedication" by its "author or proprietor." That,
however, is a misnomer, for "dedication," like "abandonment," presupposes
an intentional surrender, which is in no sense necessary to the "forfeiture" of
a copyright," An author, whose work is "forfeited," need have had no such
purpose, and ordinarily does not . ...
L. Hand, J., writing for the' court in National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publica-
tions, 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951), opinion clarified 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952).
14 See F. KASE, COPYRIGHT THOUGHT IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 6-8 (1967).
8" See Doyle, Cary, McCannon & Ringer, Study No. 7, Notice of Copyright, in I
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 229, 263-71 (Arthur Fisher mem. ed. 1963).
86 See Ringer, supra note 1, at 478 n.4, 489 n.87, and accompanying text.
87 See id.
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claim that its usefulness does not outweigh the dramatic loss of pro-
prietary rights sustained by authors in the instance where they have in-
voluntarily dedicated their work to the public domain. The case law is
replete with sad tales on this point, s8 and this is corroborated through
estimates on the extent of the problem. 89 It is argued that while the
88 Of these, the case most often referred to is Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82
(1899). Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., was the author of the serialized The Autocrat of
the Breakfast Table. The book was published in twelve successive issues of the Atlantic
Monthly during the years 1857 and 1858. Pursuant to the agreement with the
publisher, the firm was granted only the right to publish, and nothing more. No
copyright was secured, either by the author or the publisher, in any of the twelve
serialized parts. After the publication of the last issue, the book was printed as a
whole, and both Dr. Holmes and his publisher recorded copies with the district court
clerk of courts. Notice was given in every published edition of the entire book. Dr.
Holmes later (in 1886) deposited a copy with the Librarian of Congress. In 1894, the
defendant began selling copies of the book, all copied from the twelve Atlantic
Monthly issues, and saying so much on each copy of the book. Holmes brought suit for
infringement. The Supreme Court held that the entire book had been dedicated to the
public upon publication of the last Atlantic Monthly issue. Id. at 88-89.
See also cases cited in Finkelstein, The Copyright Law-A Reappraisal, 104 U.
PA. L. REv. 1025, 1054 n.89 (1956). The decisions referred to are somewhat dated,
and do not reflect the trend in recent litigation which indicates judicial willingness to
find "substantial complaince" with the statute. See, e.g., Comment, 59 MICH. L. REv.
616, 619-30 (1959). This doctrine is, in certain respects, consistent with section 404(a)
of the statute. See note 82 supra. In all likelihood, cases in the future will not turn on
the more trivial technicalities which were the critical focus in many of the cases cited
by Finkelstein.
89 Ladas has cited a statistic presented by the International Bureau of Berne in
1910 that, among the some hundred court proceedings in which the Convention had
been involved until then, one seventh of the disputes pertained to complaince with the
formalities in the country of origin. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 269-70. In another
place, Ladas says that it is estimated by authors in the United States that about one
half of the literary works are technically without copyright protection because of errors
in the fulfillment of the formalities required by law. Ladas, Inter-American Copyright,
7 U. PiTT. L. REv. 283, 289 (1941). This latter figure is partially corroborated with
the observation made by the Copyright Office that most published material bears no
notice, and is therefore in the public domain. The Office says that in these cases,
there is no desire to secure copyright; the instances where this occurs most frequently
are in the publication of pamphlets, annual reports, advertising matter, scholarly and
other informational material. Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (House Comm. Print
1961). While the creators of some of these materials would find little value in the ac-
quisition of copyright, it is questionable whether the same can be said for academic
and scientific work. More likely than not, they would probably want the benefit of
copyright for the purpose of pursuing blatant abusers. This would not be inconsistent
with acquiescence in the case of a technical infringer who photocopies for his own use,
or alternatively, where the material is put to "fair use." See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
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presence of a copyright notice may be of some assistance at times to
potential users insofar as it may give a lead or starting point in tracing
the present owner of the particular right of use in a work for which
the user would require an appropriate license, the lead is in no sense
the final answer. 90 Moreover, it is further pointed out that the United
States stands practically alone in making notice a condition of
copyright protection for all types of artistic works. 9' Now that the
United States has joined ranks with countries which grant a term of
life of the author plus fifty years, it is persuasively shown that the
notice requirement serves little value. 92
Aside from practical considerations, other proponents have taken
the position that the intent to copyright should be implied in every
artistic work:
But let us consider how important this requirement of notice of
copyright really is. What does it mean? The author expresses his in-
tention to claim his authorship in his work and therefore to prohibit
others from copying his work. But this intention is to be implied in
the fact alone that an author has expended labor and time in
creating his work and bringing it before the public. No author is to
be deemed to want his work to be copied. As stated above, literary
and artistic creation is today a profession and the author means and
expects to support himself from the economic value of his work. In
9 It merely shows that at one time there was an apparent claim of copyright
in the work by some one. The name in the notice need not necessarily be
that of the present owner of the copyright, nor need it be that of the ex-
clusive licensee of the particular right sought. Under the new principle of
"divisible ownership" [as embodied in section 101 of the new Act], the person
named in the notice may be that of a partial owner of the copyright, or an
exclusive territorial licensee concerned with rights other than those in which
the prospective user is interested.
Sargoy, Formalities and Ownership, ABA Symposium, 9 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 20,
28 (1962). Contrary to past copyright statutes, copyright ownership is now divisible.
See definition of "copyright owner," 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
" The only other countries to do so are the Phillipines (whose copyright statute is
patterned after the United States statute), Nicaragua, Argentina and Chile. Doyle,
Cary, McCannon & Ringer, Study No. 7, Notice of Copyright, in I STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 252-53 (Arthur Fisher mem. ed. 1963).
92 "In so far as the formality of notice was supposed to give evidence of the
beginning of the copyright term, it would obviously be of little value under the system
based on the life of the author plus a term of years." Young, The Copyright Term, 7
ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 139, 172 (1956). Young does point out, however, that
the date of publication would be of some value in facilitating searches in the Registra-
tion Office. Id. at 172. Also see Finkelstein, supra note 88, at 1052.
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the very rare cases where the author desires to dedicate his work to
the public, as is the case of publications issued by certain founda-
tions, this intention will be made clear by the author's desisting from
prosecuting those who copy his work or by an explicit declaration on
the work that free reproduction is permitted. 9
This would seem to conform with the European view that copyright is
akin to a natural right. But more than mere idealism, the argument is
persuasive, especially when we consider an artist who is so befuddled
by various lay interpretations of the copyright law that he decides to
ignore it, thinking that his work will bring in so little money as not to
justify the expense of a lawyer.
b. The argument for notice
The Copyright Office concluded that the public interest was best
served by keeping free of copyright restrictions the large mass of
material in which the authors do not wish to secure copyright. 94 It was
felt that notice was "a simple and highly useful device to accomplish
that purpose, and also to give the public information as to the
copyright status and ownership of any work."9 5 In support of the lat-
ter, there was considerable evidence amassed that various industries
used the notice in their everyday operations to determine whether
copyright existed in works used. 96 The Office further insisted that the
arbitrary and unjust forfeitures in the past could be avoided by relaxed
provisions concerning the inadvertent omission of, or error in the
notice. 91
c. A compromise solution
For some time,- a proposal had been offered to reconcile these op-
posing views through a system under which certain remedies would be
conditioned upon proper notice, but this notice would not affect the
inherent rights of the author. 98 Under a system such as this, notice
Ladas, Inter-American Copyright, 7 U. PITT. L. REV. 283, 287 (1941).
4 Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (House Comm. Print 1961).
95 Id.
96 Blaisdell, Study No. 8, Commercial Use of the Copyright Notice, in I STUDIES
ON COPYRIGHT 275 (Arthur Fisher mem. ed. 1963).
9' Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (House Comm. Print 1961).
91 This proposed scheme first appeared as part of the Vestal Bill (on copyright
revision) which passed in the House of Representatives in 1931. H.R. 12549, 71st
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would be abolished as a mandatory requirement of copyright protec-
tion. For the benefit of the innocent infringer (since under this system
he would not be guaranteed notice), the following conditions would
apply: The innocent infringer would be subject to an injunction only
upon reimbursement of his reasonable outlay innocently incurred.
Secondly, actual notice would have the effect of removing his defense
of innocence for undertakings begun thereafter. Third, the infringer
might or might not be subject to a reasonable license fee. 99 Finally, no
other remedies, including statutory damages, would be available
against the infringer. Accordingly, a plan such as this would offer a
substantial incentive to provide notice, since a copyright owner would
be entitled to damages if notice were given.
d. Analysis
No doubt, mandatory notice will continue to serve some useful
function. Primarily, its presence or absence will indicate to would be
users whether there is need for inquiry. Contrary to the Copyright Of-
fice's assumption, however, it is highly questionable to presume that
the absence of notice shows an intent not to copyright, especially with
respect to authors of scientific and academic articles. 00 Moreover, the
utility of notice has been reduced because the term of copyright for
works created after 1977 begins, not with the date of publication, but
with the date of the author's death, i.e., the date of publication will
have no bearing on the term. For works which received copyright pro-
tection before the Act went into effect, the date of publication will still
Cong., 2d Sess. (1931). The bill ws eventually defeated. It resurfaced in the Shotwell
Bill of 1940, S. 3043, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940), another ill-fated measure. Finally,
in its exhaustive study on notice, the Copyright Office indicated its awareness of this
approach. See Doyle, Cary, McCannon & Ringer, Study No. 7, Notice of Copyright,
in I STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 273 (Arthur Fisher mem. ed. 1963). Also see the com-
ments written in to the Copyright Office by Harry Henn recommending substantially
the same proposal. Id.
99 The Vestal Bill would have permitted a remedy for "the fair and reasonable
value of a license." Mr. Henn's proposal did not allow for such liability. See note 98
supra, and citations therein.
10O A further argument has been made that free communication and scholarship
would be hampered under a system in which notice is not required; for a person might
be discouraged from using a work out of fear that it is copyrighted. Thus, so the argu-
ment continues, publication without notice is a way of informing the public that the
work should be freely circulated and used. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Patents 'on H.R. 10434, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1926). But see notes 62 & 89 supra.
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serve a useful purpose,' 0 ' but this, in and of itself, is no reason to con-
tinue requring its inclusion in later works. Though notice will serve as
a somewhat useful lead in researching copyright ownership, it is by no
means a final answer. The main effect of continuing to impose notice
requirements will be to keep free of copyright restrictions the great
bulk of published material produced in the United States today.
From an administrative point of view this may have been a wise
decision, since the copyright workload is that much more reduced each
time that notice is omitted. Similarly, the forfeiture issue seems to have
been handled in a reasonable fashion through the relaxed provisions
for correcting errors or omissions. The glaring problem, however, is
the minimum value contributed to our copyright law by the require-
ment of notice.
The compromise measure discussed above represents a better solu-
tion to the question of notice. First of all, under the incentive ap-
proach, the problem of forfeiture would drop out of copyright law
completely. At the same time, the innocent infringer would be given
adequate protection in the event of a suit. Even if a reasonable license
fee were to be assessed against him, the net effect would be the same
as under our present law, since notice triggers the inquiry which
ultimately leads to the payment for use of the copyright. Under the in-
centive approach, the scholar or scientist who has failed to give notice
would, at the very least, have the remedy of an injunction available to
correct any blatant abuse of his work. Though a provision such as this
increases the likelihood of litigation, in the vast majority of cases, a
minor copyright infringement would not justify the expense of a
lawsuit. Moreover, where the stakes are high, artists and publishers
would be expected to take greater pains to assure themselves of an
adequate remedy by making sure that notice is given. In short, all in-
terests are protected, and the role played by notice takes on a
character which more nearly comports with its real significance.
CONCLUSION
The issues of moral right and mandatory notice have remained
obstacles to Berne entry for some time. American courts have been in-
clined to declare that the moral right is not recognized because our
copyright law is commercially based, and is not concerned with protec-
101 Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1976), subsisting copyrights will receive pro-
tection for 75 years from the date of publication.
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ting the personality of the author. Mandatory notice continues to be
justified on the assumption that copyright is not sought for the vast
majority of works which are published each year.
It has been shown that our courts have not been unmindful of the
unique problems of the author, and have developed a body of law out-
side of copyright which substantially recognizes the moral right. There
appears to be no obstacle to Berne accession because of the moral
right doctrine. Also demonstrated has been the modern concern over
the problem of forfeiture of copyright due to the omission of notice.
The response to the forfeiture issue, thus far, has been the develop-
ment of a "substantial compliance" doctrine by the courts,102 and the
various relaxed notice requirements offered by the Congress in the
1976 Copyright Act. 103 Nevertheless, the notice provisions of our new
copyright statute remain the major stumbling block to United States
adoption of the Berne Convention.
In all probability, the notice question will remain dormant for
many years to come. The present copyright statute is the product of
far too many years of deliberation and compromise for anyone
reasonably to expect revision in the near future. But eventually the
urge to tinker with the Act will come. At that time, mandatory notice
is likely to be called into question again, and the better course would
be to replace our present requirements with the incentive scheme
outlined in this Note and, as a consequence, remove the final major
conflict between our own copyright law and the Berne Convention.
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